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Abstract. In this survey paper we consider the class of protocols for information-
hiding which use randomization to obfuscate the link between the observables
and the information to be protected. We focus on the problem of formalizing the
notion of information hiding, and verifying that a given protocol achieves the in-
tended degree of protection. Without the pretense of being omni-comprehensive,
we review the main approaches that have been explored in literature: possibilistic,
probabilistic, information-theoretic, and statistical.
1 Introduction
During the last decade, internet activities have become an important part of many peo-
ple’s lives. As the number of these activities increases, there is a growing amount of
personal information about the users that is stored in electronic form and that is usu-
ally transferred using public electronic means. This makes it feasible and often easy to
collect, transfer and process a huge amount of information about a person. As a conse-
quence, the need for mechanisms to protect such information is compelling.
A recent example of such privacy concerns are the so-called “biometric” passports.
These passports, used by many countries and required by all visa waiver travelers to the
United States, include a RFID chip containing information about the passport’s owner.
These chips can be read wirelessly without any contact with the passport and without
the owner even knowing that his passport is being read. It is clear that such devices need
protection mechanisms to ensure that the contained information will not be revealed to
any non-authorized person.
In general, privacy can be defined as the ability of users to stop information about
themselves from becoming known to people other than those they choose to give the
information to. We can further categorize privacy properties based on the nature of the
hidden information. Data protection usually refers to confidential data like the credit
card number. Anonymity, on the other hand, concerns the identity of the user who per-
formed a certain action. Unlinkability refers to the link between the information and the
user, and unobservability regards the actions of a user.
⋆ This work has been partially supported by the INRIA DREI E´quipe Associe´e PRINTEMPS
and by the INRIA ARC project ProNoBiS.
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Information-hiding protocols aim at ensuring a privacy property during an elec-
tronic transaction. For example, the voting protocol Foo 92 ([1]) allows a user to cast a
vote without revealing the link between the voter and the vote. The anonymity protocol
Crowds ([2]) allows a user to send a message on a public network without revealing the
identity of the sender.
Several anonymity protocols use randomized primitives to obtain the obfuscation of
the information to be protected. This is the case, for instance, of the Dining Cryptog-
raphers [3], which use coin-flipping, Crowds [2] and Onion Routing [4], which select
randomly another user of the network to forward the message to, and Freenet [5]. In
this survey, we restrict our attention to the case in which the use of randomization is
critical to achieve the intended security properties.
2 The possibilistic approaches
These are by far the approaches which have been explored the most in literature. Various
formal definitions and frameworks for analyzing information-hiding have been devel-
oped. Some examples of these approaches are those based on epistemic logic ([6, 7]),
on “function views” ([8]), and on process-calculi ([9, 10]). Here we focus on the last
kind of approach.
Often possibilistic approaches rely on nondeterminism: a protocol provides protec-
tion if the set of possible observable outcomes is saturated with respect to the secrets.
More precisely, if in one computation the instance of the secret to protect is s and the
observable outcome is o, then for every other instance s′ there must be a computation
where, with secret s′, the observable is still o. Formally:
f−1(f(P )) ∼ P
where P is the protocol, and f is a relabeling function that maps all the secrets into a
dummy, and ∼ is a chosen equivalence relation [9].
A related approach is the one by [11, 12], where the authors specify privacy in elec-
tronic voting (protection of the secrecy of the vote) as the property that if we swap the
way in which two users, A and B, vote, then the resulting system is weakly bisimilar to
the original one. Formally:
C[A[a/v]|B[b/v]] ≈ C[A[a/v]|B[b/v]]
where a, b represent the votes of A and B respectively, and the context C[ ] represents
the rest of the protocol.
This kind of approach is reasonable, as long as the protocols of interest do not
involve the use of randomization. In case they do, then we have a problem, because
the pure possibilistic approach is unable to cope with probabilities. So, the choice is
either to move to a probabilistic approach, or to try to abstract from probabilities. The
second choice is explored in [9]: In that paper, the authors replace probabilistic choice
by nondeterministic choice, and then apply the usual possibilistic definition.
We now illustrate the above idea on the example of the dining cryptographers.
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Fig. 1. Chaum’s protocol for the dining cryptographers [3].
2.1 The dining cryptographers’ problem
This problem, described by Chaum in [3], involves a situation in which three cryptog-
raphers are dining together. At the end of the dinner, each of them is secretly informed
by the master whether he should pay the bill or not. So, either the master will pay,
or he will ask one of the cryptographers to pay. The cryptographers, or some external
observer, would like to find out whether the payer is one of them or the master. How-
ever, if the payer is one of them, the cryptographers wish to maintain anonymity over
the identity of the payer. Of course, we assume that the master himself will not reveal
this information, and also we want the solution to be distributed, i.e. communication
can be achieved only via message passing, and there is no central memory or central
‘coordinator’ which can be used to find out this information.
A possible solution to this problem, described in [3], is the following: Each cryp-
tographer tosses a coin, which is visible to himself and to his neighbor to the right.
Each cryptographer then observes the two coins that he can see, and announces agree
or disagree. If a cryptographer is not paying, he will announce agree if the two sides
are the same and disagree if they are not. However, if he is paying then he will say the
opposite. It can be proved that if the number of disagrees is even, then the master is
paying; otherwise, one of the cryptographers is paying. Furthermore, if one of the cryp-
tographers is paying, then neither an external observer nor the other two cryptographers
can identify, from their individual information, who exactly is paying.
In order to specify formally the protocol, we use a probabilistic version of the π-
calculus, πp, which is essentially the π-calculus enriched with a probabilistic choice
operator ⊕p. For a precise definition of the semantics of πp we refer to [13].
The protocol can be described as the parallel composition of the master process
Master, the cryptographers processes Crypt i, of the coin processes Coinh, and of a
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Master = m0〈0〉 .m1〈0〉 .m2〈0〉 ⊕p
L
2
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pim0+i〈1〉 .m1+i〈0〉 .m2+i〈0〉
Crypt i = ci,i(x0) . ci,i+1(x1) .mi(x) . payi〈x〉 . out i〈x0 + x1 + x〉
Coinh = ch−1,h〈0〉 . ch,h〈0〉 ⊕ph ch−1,h〈1〉 . ch,h〈1〉
Collect = out0(y0) . out1(y1) . out2(y2) . outall〈y0, y1, y2〉
DC = (ν~c)(ν ~m)(ν ~out)(Master |
Q
i
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Q
h
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Table 1. The dining cryptographers protocol expressed in πp.
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Table 2. The nondeterministic version of the dining cryptographers protocol expressed in π.
process Collect1 whose purpose is to collect all the declarations of the cryptographers,
and output them in the form of a tuple. See Table 1. In this protocol, the secret actions
are payi〈x〉, and the observable actions are outall〈y0, y1, y2〉.
2.2 Nondeterministic version of the dining cryptographers
In the approach of [9] the dining cryptographers are formalized as a purely nondeter-
ministic system: the coins are approximated by nondeterministic coins, and the choice
on who pays the bill is also nondeterministic. The specification of the solution can be
given in π-calculus as illustrated in Table 2 (in the original work [9] the authors used
CSP [14]).
Let f be the function f(pay i) = pay and f(α) = α for all the other actions. It
is possible to check that f−1(f(DC))) ∼T DC, where we recall that ∼T stands for
trace equivalence. Hence the nondeterministic notion of anonymity, as defined at the
beginning of this section, is satisfied.
As a consequence of approximating the coins by nondeterministic coins, we cannot
differentiate between a fair coin and a biased one. However, it is evident that the fairness
of the coins is essential to ensure the anonymity property in the system, as illustrated
by the following example.
Example 1. Assume that, whenever a cryptographer pays, an external observer obtains
almost always one of the three outcomes represented in Figure 2, where a stands for
agree and d for disagree. More precisely, assume that these three outcomes appear
1 The presence of the process Collect is due to technical reasons that have to do with the control
of the power of the scheduler, and are out of the scope of this paper.
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Fig. 2. Illustration of Example 1: the results that are observed with high frequency.
with a frequency of 33% each, while the missing configuration, d, a, a, appears with a
frequency of only 1%. What can the observer deduce? By examining all possible cases,
it is easy to see that the coins must be biased, and more precisely, Coin0 and Coin1
must produce almost always head, andCoin2 must produce almost always tail (or vice-
versa). From this estimation, it is immediate to conclude that, in the first case, the payer
is almost for sure Crypt1, in the second case Crypt2, and in the third case Crypt0.
In the situation illustrated in the above example, clearly, the system does not pro-
vide anonymity. However the nondeterministic definition of anonymity is still satisfied
(and it is satisfied in general, as long as “almost always” is not “always”, i.e. the fourth
configuration d, a, a also appears, from time to time). The problem is that the nonde-
terministic definition can only express whether or not it is possible to have a particular
outcome, but cannot express whether one outcome is more likely than the other.
3 The probabilistic approaches
The probabilistic approaches have been investigated in particular in the field of anony-
mity, and almost exclusively in the strongest form, namely to express the property that
the observables reveal no (quantitative) information about the secrets (strong anony-
mity).
There are essentially three probabilistic notions considered in literature: one based
on the equality of the a posteriori probabilities, one based on the equality between the
a posteriori probability and the a priori probability, and one based on the equality of
the likelyhoods. All of them involve the notion of conditional probability p(a|b), which
represents the probability of the event a, given the event b. We recall the equality known
as Bayes theorem:
p(a|b) =
p(b|a) p(a)
p(b)
These probabilistic notions also require that the secrets are mutually exclusive events,
and that
∑
s p(s) = 1. The same for the observables.
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Equality of the a posteriori probabilities The idea is to say that a system is strongly
secure if, for any observable o, the a posteriori probability of a secret s (namely p(s|o))
is the same as the a posteriori probability of any other secret s′. Formally:
p(s|o) = p(s′|o) for all observables o, and secrets s and s′ (1)
This is similar to the definition of strong anonymity by Halpern and O’Neill [7], al-
though their setting is different, being based on a probabilistic version of epistemic
logic.
Equality of the a posteriori and a priori probabilities The idea is to say that a system
is strongly secure if, for any observable o, the a posteriori probability of a secret s is
the same as its a priori one. In other words, the observation does not add anything to
the expectation that the secret is s. Formally:
p(s|o) = p(s) for all observables o, and secrets s (2)
This is the definition of anonymity adopted by Chaum in [3]. He also proved that the
DC satisfies it if the coins are fair. Halpern and O’Neill also consider a similar property
in their epistemological setting, and they call it conditional anonymity [7].
Equality of the likelihoods The idea is to say that a system is strongly secure if, for
any observable o, the likelihood of a secret s given o (namely p(o|s)) is the same as the
same as the likelihood of any other secret s′. Formally:
p(o|s) = p(o|s′) for all observables o, and secrets s and s′ (3)
This was proposed as definition of strong anonymity by Bhargava and Palamidessi [15].
3.1 Comparison
It is easy to see that definitions (2) and (3) are equivalent. In fact:
(2) ⇒ (3) )
p(o|s) =
p(s|o) p(o)
p(s)
by Bayes theorem
= p(o) by (2)
=
p(s′|o) p(o)
p(s′)
by (2)
= p(o|s′) by Bayes theorem
(2) ⇐ (3) ) We prove that p(o|s) = p(o) for all observables o, and secrets s. From this
it is immediate to derive (2) by applying Bayes theorem.
p(o) =
∑
s p(o and s) by the disjointness of the secrets
=
∑
s p(o|s) p(s) by definition of conditional probability
= p(o|s)
∑
s p(s) by (3)
= p(o|s) since
∑
s p(s) = 1
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Definition (3) has the advantage that it makes clear that depends only on the protocol,
not in the distribution on the secrets, and, more important, it does extend in a natural
way to the case in which the choice of the secret is done nondeterministically. See [15]
for more details.
Concerning definition (1), it probably looks at a first site the most natural, but it
actually turns out to be too strong. that one is strictly stronger than (2) and (3). In fact
it is equivalent to (2) and (3), plus the condition that the probability distribution of the
secrets is uniform, namely
p(s) = p(s′) for all secrets s and s′ (4)
(1) ⇒ (4) )
p(s) =
∑
o p(s and o) by the disjointness of the secrets
=
∑
o p(s|o) p(o) by definition of conditional probability
=
∑
o p(s
′|o) p(o) by (1)
=
∑
o p(s
′ and o)
= p(s′)
(1) ⇒ (3) )
p(o|s) =
p(s|o) p(o)
p(s)
by Bayes theorem
=
p(s′|o) p(o)
p(s)
by (1)
=
p(s′|o) p(o)
p(s′)
by (4)
= p(o|s′) by Bayes theorem
(1) ⇐ (3),(4))
p(s|o) =
p(o|s) p(s)
p(o)
by Bayes theorem
=
p(o|s′) p(s)
p(o)
by (3)
=
p(o|s′) p(s′)
p(o)
by (4)
= p(s′|o) by Bayes theorem
It is interesting to notice that (4) can be split in two orthogonal properties: one which
depends only in the protocol ( (3) ), and one which depends only in the distribution on
the secrets ( (4) ).
In our opinion condition (4) is not a suitable condition for defining the notion of
protection provided by a protocol, because it only depends on the distribution on the
secret data, which can be influenced by the users, but not by the protocol. We believe
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that a good notion of protection should abstract from such distribution. In this sense we
consider (1) too strong.
There are also weaker notions of protection, still based on the comparison between
conditional probabilities, which have been investigated in literature. In particular, Rubin
and Reiter proposed the concepts of possible innocence and of probable innocence [2].
See also [16] for a generalization of the latter.
The need for formalizing weaker forms of protection comes from the fact that the
strong properties discussed above are almost never achieved in practice. Hence the need
to express in a quantitative way the degree of protection. Researchers have been explor-
ing for suitable notions within the well-extablished fields of Information Theory and of
Statistics.
4 Information theory
Recently it has been observed that at an abstract level information-hiding protocols can
be viewed as channels in the information-theoretic sense. A channel consists of a set of
input values S, a set of output values O (the observables) and a transition matrix which
gives the conditional probability p(o|s) of producing o as the output when s is the input.
In the case of protocols for information hiding, S contains the secret information that
we want to protect and O the facts that the attacker can observe.
Let us revise some of the basic concepts of Information Theory: LetX be a random
variable. The entropy H(X) of X is defined as
H(X) = −
∑
x∈X
p(x) log p(x)
The entropy measures the uncertainty of a random variable. It takes its maximum value
log |X | whenX’s distribution is uniform and its minimum value 0 whenX is constant.
We usually take the logarithm with a base 2 and measure entropy in bits. Roughly
speaking,m bits of entropy means that we have 2m values to choose from, assuming a
uniform distribution.
The relative entropy or Kullback–Leibler distance between two probability distri-
butions p, q on the same set X is defined as
D(p ‖ q) =
∑
x∈X
p(x)log
p(x)
q(x)
It is possible to prove that D(p ‖ q) is always non-negative, and it is 0 if and only if
p = q.
Now let X,Y be random variables. The conditional entropy H(X|Y ) is
H(X|Y ) = −
∑
y∈Y
p(y)
∑
x∈X
p(x|y) log p(x|y)
Conditional entropy measures the amount of uncertainty ofX when Y is known. It can
be shown that 0 ≤ H(X|Y ) ≤ H(X). It takes its maximum value H(X) when Y re-
veals no information aboutX , and its minimum value 0 when Y completely determines
the value of X .
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ComparingH(X) andH(X|Y ) gives us the concept ofmutual information I(X;Y ),
which is defined as
I(X;Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y )
Mutual information measures the amount of information that one random variable con-
tains about another random variable. In other words, it measures the amount of uncer-
tainty about X that we lose when observing Y . It can be shown that it is symmetric
(I(X;Y ) = I(Y ;X)) and that 0 ≤ I(X;Y ) ≤ H(X).
The maximum mutual information betweenX and Y over all possible distributions
p(x) is known as the channel’s capacity:
C = max
p(x)
I(X;Y )
The capacity of a channel gives the maximum rate at which information can be trans-
mitted using this channel.
In the following we recall some of the notions of protection, based on information-
theoretic notions, which have been proposed in literature.
In [17, 18] the authors propose a notion of anonymity based on the entropy of the
users. The idea is to represent the lack of information that an attacker has about the
secrets. Note that this is not in line with our point of view: in our opinion the interesting
thing is to model the capability of the protocol to conceal the secret information despite
of the observables that are made available to the attacker.
Zhu and Bettati propose in [19] a definition of anonymity based on mutual informa-
tion.
In [20, 21] the authors study the ability to have covert communication as a result of
non-perfect anonymity. In [21] the authors suggest that the channel’s capacity can be
used as an asymptotic measure of the worst-case loss of anonymity.
In [22] we explore the implications of adopting the (converse of the) notion of ca-
pacity as measure of the degree of protection, and we introduce a more general concept
that we call conditional capacity.
Note that the capacity is an abstraction of mutual information obtained by maxi-
mizing over the possible input distributions. As a consequence, we get a measure that
depends only on the protocol and not on the input distribution, which is an advantage
with respect to the mutual-information approach because in general we don’t know the
input distribution, and it also may change over time. Of course, in case we know the in-
put distribution, then the mutual-information approach is more precise because it gives
the exact loss of anonymity for the specific situation.
In [23] the authors use the Kullback-Leibler distance to perform a metric analysis
of anonymity.
In [24] the authors define as information leakage the difference between the a priori
accuracy of the guess of the attacker, and the a posteriori one, after the attacker has
made his observation. The accuracy of the guess is defined as the Kullback-Leibler
distance between the belief (which is a weight attributed by the attacker to each input
hypothesis) and the true distribution on the hypotheses.
In the field of information flow and non-interference there is a line of research which
is closely related. There have been various works [25–30] in which the high information
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and the low information are seen as the input and output respectively of a channel. From
an abstract point of view, the setting is very similar; technically it does not matter what
kind of information we are trying to conceal, what is relevant for the analysis is only
the probabilistic relation between the input and the output information.
5 Hypothesis testing
In information-hiding systems the attacker finds himself in the following scenario: he
cannot directly detect the information of interest, namely the actual value of the random
variable S ∈ S, but he can discover the value of another random variable O ∈ O which
depends on S according to a known conditional distribution. This kind of situation
is quite common also in other disciplines, like medicine, biology, and experimental
physics, to mention a few. The attempt to infer S fromO is called hypothesis testing (the
“hypothesis” to be validated is the actual value of S), and it has been widely investigated
in statistics.
In this section we discuss possible methods by which an adversary can try to infer
the secrets from the observables, and consider the corresponding probability of error,
that it, the probability that the adversary draws the wrong conclusion. We regard the
probability of error as a representative of the degree of protection provided by the pro-
tocol, and we study its properties with respect to the associated matrix.
We start by recalling the notion of decision function, which represent the guess the
adversary makes about the secrets, for each observable: a decision function is simply
any function f : O → S .
The probability of error associated to a decision function f is the probability of
guessing the wrong hypothesis by using f , averaged on all possible observables. In
general the probability of error depends on the input distribution and on the channel’s
matrix. We will use the notation P(f,M, ~p) to represent the probability of error asso-
ciated to the decision function f , the channel’s matrix M , and the input distribution
~p. The following characterization of P(f,M, ~p) is well-known in literature, see for in-
stance [31].
P(f,M, ~p) = 1−
∑
O
p(o|f(o))pf(o) (5)
Given a channel (S,O,M), the best decision function that the adversary can use,
namely the one that minimizes the probability of error, is the one associated to the
so-called MAP rule, which prescribes to choose the hypothesis s which has Maximum
Aposteriori Probability (for a given o ∈ O), namely the s for which p(s|o) is maximum.
The fact that the MAP rule represent the ‘best bet’ of the adversary is rather intuitive,
and well known in literature. We refer to [31] for a formal proof.
The MAP rule is used in the so-called Bayesian approach to hypothesis testing, and
the corresponding probability of error is also known as Bayes risk. We will denote it by
PMAP(M, ~p). The following characterization is an immediate consequence of (5) and of
the Bayes theorem p(s|o) = p(o|s)ps/p(o).
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PMAP(M, ~p) = 1−
∑
O
max
s
(p(o|s)ps)
In [32] we have proposed to express the degree of protection Pt provided by a
protocol T in terms of the probability of error of the corresponding matrixM(T ):
PtMAP(T, ~p) = PMAP(M(T ), ~p)
The problem with the MAP rule is that it assumes that the input distribution is
known to the adversary. This is often not the case, so it is natural to try to approximate it
with some other rule. One such rule is the so-called ML rule, which prescribes to choose
the s which has Maximum Likelihood (for a given o ∈ O), namely the s for which
p(o|s) is maximum. The name comes from the fact that p(o|s) is called the likelihood
of s given o. We will denote the corresponding probability of error by PML(M, ~p). The
following characterization is an immediate consequence of (5).
PML(M, ~p) = 1−
∑
O
max
s
(p(o|s))ps
It has been shown (see for instance [22]) that under certain conditions on the matrix,
the ML rule approximates indeed the MAP rule, in the sense that by repeating the
protocol the adversary can make the probability of error arbitrarily close to 0, with
either rule.
We have also explored, in [32], the possibility of defining the degree of protection
provided by a term T under the ML rule as PML(M(T ), ~p), but it did not seem reason-
able to give a definition that depends on the input distribution, since the main reason to
apply a non-Bayesian approach is that we do not know the input distribution. Instead,
we have defined the degree of protection associated to a process term as the average
probability of error with respect to all possible distributions ~p:
PtML(T ) = (m− 1)!
∫
~p
PML(M(T ), ~p) d~p
In previous definition, (m − 1)! represents a normalization function: 1(m−1)! is the
hyper-volume of the domain of all possible distributions ~p on S, namely the (m − 1)-
dimensional space of points ~p such that 0 ≤ ps ≤ 1 and 0 ≤
∑
s∈S ps = 1 (where m
is the cardinality of S).
Fortunately, it turns out that this definition is equivalent to a much simpler one: the
average value of the probability of error, under the Maximum Likelihood rule, can be
obtained simply by computing PML on the uniform distribution ~pu = (
1
m
, 1
m
, . . . , 1
m
):
PtML(T ) = min
ζ∈A
PML(Mζ(T ), ~pu)
We believe that the probability of error is a central notion for information-hiding,
and we expect that it will be thoroughly explored in the next future.
In [33] we have characterized the Bayes risk in terms of the solution of certain sys-
tems of equations derived from the matrix of the channel. This has lead to an algorithm
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to compute the maximum value of the Bayes risk. Furthermore, it has allowed us to
improve functional bounds on the Bayes risk.
In [32] we have studied how the operators of πp affect the probability of error. In
particular, we have characterized constructs that have the property of not decreasing the
degree of protection, and that can therefore be considered safe in the modular construc-
tion of protocols. As a case study, we apply these techniques to the Dining Cryptogra-
phers, and we are able to derive a generalization of Chaum’s strong anonymity result
for the Dining Criptographers. More precisely, we have shown that the Dining Cryptog-
raphers on an arbitrary graph (where the nodes are the cryptographers and the arcs are
the coins) is strongly anonymous if and only there is a spanning tree formed entirely of
fair coins.
6 Computing the matrix associated to a protocol
In this section we show how to compute the matrix associated to a protocol specified in
πp, using our (very preliminary) πp model checker VAMP (http://vamp.gforge.
inria.fr/).
We consider the protocol for the DC represented in Table 1. Assume we want to
compute p(o|si), where si represents the fact that the cryptographer i is the payer, and
o is of the form outall〈yo, y1, y2〉. We redefine the Master to be
mi〈1〉 .mi+1〈0〉 .mi+2〈0〉
Then, we run the resulting process DC in VAMP, with query o. VAMP gives as result
the (unconditional) probability of executing o in the new specification, which corre-
sponds to the conditional probability p(o|si) in the original specification.
We have computed various channel matrices, for different values of the probability
p that a coin gives heads (we assume that each coin is biased in the same way). The
results are shown in Fig. 3.
Finally, from the matrix, we can compute the capacity. This can be done, in general,
by using the Arimoto-Blahut approximation algorithm, or, under certain symmetry con-
ditions, we can apply a formula (see [22] for more details).
In this case we could apply the formula because the conditions are satisfied. The re-
sulting graph is displayed in Fig. 4. As expected, when p = 0.5 the protocol is strongly
anonymous and the relative loss of anonymity is 0. When p approaches 0 or 1, the at-
tacker can deduce the identity of the payer with increasingly high probability, so the
capacity increases. In the extreme case where the coins are totally biased the attacker
can be sure about the payer, and the capacity takes its maximum value of log 3.
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daa ada aad ddd aaa dda dad add
c1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0 0 0 0
c2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0 0 0 0
c3 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0 0 0 0
m 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
daa ada aad ddd aaa dda dad add
c1 0.28 0.24 0.24 0.24 0 0 0 0
c2 0.24 0.28 0.24 0.24 0 0 0 0
c3 0.24 0.24 0.28 0.24 0 0 0 0
m 0 0 0 0 0.28 0.24 0.24 0.24
daa ada aad ddd aaa dda dad add
c1 0.37 0.21 0.21 0.21 0 0 0 0
c2 0.21 0.37 0.21 0.21 0 0 0 0
c3 0.21 0.21 0.37 0.21 0 0 0 0
m 0 0 0 0 0.37 0.21 0.21 0.21
daa ada aad ddd aaa dda dad add
c1 0.52 0.16 0.16 0.16 0 0 0 0
c2 0.16 0.52 0.16 0.16 0 0 0 0
c3 0.16 0.16 0.52 0.16 0 0 0 0
m 0 0 0 0 0.52 0.16 0.16 0.16
daa ada aad ddd aaa dda dad add
c1 0.73 0.09 0.09 0.09 0 0 0 0
c2 0.09 0.73 0.09 0.09 0 0 0 0
c3 0.09 0.09 0.73 0.09 0 0 0 0
m 0 0 0 0 0.73 0.09 0.09 0.09
Fig. 3. The channel matrices for probability of heads p = 0.5, p = 0.6, p = 0.7, p = 0.8, and
p = 0.9
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Fig. 4. The degree of anonymity in the Dining Cryptographers as a function of the coins’ proba-
bility to yield heads.
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